https://nasim-e-kherad.ismc.ir/ Nasim-e-Kherad en daily 1 Sat, 20 Feb 2027 00:00:00 +0330 Sat, 20 Feb 2027 00:00:00 +0330 https://nasim-e-kherad.ismc.ir/article_218575.html In his book The Concept of Mind (1949), Gilbert Ryle denies the existence of the soul and considers belief in its existence a category mistake. Using a series of illustrative examples, Ryle explains the nature of category mistakes, generalizing this concept to the soul, and considering belief in the soul a similar error. While he accepts the existence of mental states, he argues that, unlike physical states attributed to the body, non-physical states should not be attributed to an immaterial substance called the soul. According to Ryle, mental states are nothing more than behavioral dispositions, and the belief in a substance that underlies these states stems from a misuse of language. In his view, the soul is merely a name assigned to the collection of mental states and has no reality beyond language. This study employs an analytical-critical method to examine and evaluate Ryle’s view. Although the notion of a category mistake or confusion of categories—which he employs to deny the existence of the soul—is a valid and well-defined fallacy in its proper context, its unjustified generalization to the soul is unwarranted. Applying the conclusions drawn from Ryle’s examples to the soul constitutes a fallacy of faulty generalization. On the other hand, strong philosophical arguments have been presented to prove the existence of the soul, demonstrating that the soul’s reality is undeniable and that a rational and justified belief in its existence cannot be dismissed as a mere category mistake. https://nasim-e-kherad.ismc.ir/article_240106.html In Frege’s view, every form of reference (irjāʿ) from a word to an extra‑mental object occurs solely through the mediation of conceptual representation. By contrast, Russell and the early Wittgenstein maintained that applying such a theory leads to the problem of relativism. To escape this difficulty, they adopted two philosophical doctrines. First, in order to exit the realm of the mind, awareness must, via concepts, terminate in knowledge in which the subject is directly acquainted with a particular existing object in the outside world.  Second, following from this epistemic doctrine, they inferred a linguistic doctrine: in linguistic propositions, there are always words that contain no descriptive or conceptual meaning whatsoever, but are coined solely to serve as directly referential devices pointing to realities with which we are immediately acquainted. ʿAllāmah Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, in evaluating these two doctrines, sides with Frege regarding the second doctrine (concerning the impossibility of purely non-descriptive words), while granting Russell and Wittgenstein partial correctness regarding the first doctrine, but only in the domain of qaḍāyā‑yi khārijiyyah (propositions about extra‑mental states of affairs). After a brief examination of the second doctrine, this article—using a descriptive‑analytic method—offers an extended analysis of the first doctrine, namely the “impossibility of direct reference of words” (imtināʿ‑i dalālat‑i mustaqīm‑i alfāẓ). It then considers the implications of this debate for the nature of “meaning” (maʿnā), the proper task of philosophy, and the determination of philosophical method. https://nasim-e-kherad.ismc.ir/article_234746.html Philosophical education, as one of the most comprehensive forms of education, has been defined in diverse ways by different thinkers. Providing a holistic definition that both encompasses the various existing perspectives and offers a distinct viewpoint contributes to a deeper understanding of the concept. Accordingly, the main objective of this study is to refine the concept of philosophical education and propose a new definition based on an analysis of existing definitions. After a semantic examination of the components of the term—namely “education” and “philosophy”—a new definition of philosophical education is presented in connection with the concept of rational life. This redefinition, grounded in the practice of a rational life, clarifies the position of philosophical education in life. It also highlights the importance of codifying and implementing this educational approach in society to nurture wisdom-seeking and wise individuals, as well as enhancing collective rationality toward the realization of a rational community. The study employed a documentary method, gathering data through library research. Subsequently, using meta-synthesis, the information and ideas presented in previous studies were analyzed. The final inference demonstrates the intrinsic link between “philosophical education” and the concept of “philosophical life.” https://nasim-e-kherad.ismc.ir/article_228512.html This study systematically examines the ontological nature of nīyyah (intention) and its relationship to external action as presented in Islamic narrations, through the lens of Ḥikmat-e Mutaʿāliyyah (Transcendent Philosophy). It addresses the fundamental question: What is the ontological status of nīyyah that makes it more foundational, superior, and efficacious than external action? Using a descriptive-analytical approach and library-based research, the study presents a precise conceptual framework of nīyyah and its relation to external actions. It concludes that the human soul (nafs)—in its graded and unified reality—manifests actions in two domains: jawāriḥī (by limbs) and jawānḥī (by the heart). The action by limbs precedes the action by the heart in ontological rank and serves as its causal foundation. Thus, external actions are contingent upon the actions through the heart and are considered their fruit and outcome. Furthermore, since nīyyah is classified as an action by limbs, it occupies a higher metaphysical rank than external deeds. It is therefore more virtuous (afḍal), more impactful, and plays a more significant role in guiding the human being toward divine closeness (qurb ilā Allāh). https://nasim-e-kherad.ismc.ir/article_235114.html The principle of tarjīḥ bilā marjiḥ (making a preference without a preference/preponderance without a preponderant) is one of the foundational rational principles in Islamic philosophy and theology. It asserts the impossibility of preferring one possibility over another without the presence of a causal or rational preference. Historically, this principle has played a decisive role in rejecting views grounded in randomness or non-causal selection. One contemporary theory that poses a significant challenge to philosophical theology is the “random selection of worlds,” advanced within the framework of multiverse hypotheses and certain interpretations of quantum mechanics. This theory claims that the emergence or selection of our world among countless possible worlds is merely the outcome of a random event, requiring no rational preference. The necessity of the present study lies in addressing this challenge from a rational‑philosophical perspective, while drawing upon the Islamic intellectual tradition in a manner that enables dialogue with Western philosophy of religion and simultaneously remains faithful to the foundations of Islamic philosophy. The findings demonstrate that any attempt to justify the random selection of a world inevitably falls into the problem of tarjīḥ bilā marjiḥ, and is therefore logically incomplete. The originality of this research lies in two dimensions: first, a comparative interpretation of this principle within the context of dialogue between Islamic philosophy and contemporary philosophy of religion; second, the presentation of a new analytical model showing that even physical models of randomness require a preference at the metaphysical level. This study adopts an analytical‑critical approach, examining the epistemological and ontological foundations of the principle of tarjīḥ bilā marjiḥ, and applying it to critique the theory of random selection of worlds, thereby highlighting the potential for interdisciplinary dialogue and critique. https://nasim-e-kherad.ismc.ir/article_235223.html One of the fundamental issues in anthropology and the philosophy of the soul is explaining how reason, as a higher and immaterial faculty, governs the lower levels of the soul and the body—such as faculties of perception and movement, and bodily actions. Drawing upon the principles of Transcendent Philosophy (Ḥikmat al‑Mutaʿāliyah) and employing a descriptive–analytical method, this study examines how reason can direct and manage these lower faculties despite their material and inferior nature. Based on principles such as the primacy of existence (aṣālat al‑wujūd), the unity and simplicity of the soul, the union of soul and body, and substantial motion (ḥarakat jawharīyah), it is shown that reason, as the highest level of the soul, possesses a pervasive, active, and graded presence across other dimensions, guiding them accordingly. This interpretation of reason as a dynamic and immanent presence within the soul’s realms provides a philosophical framework for understanding human action in relation to its existential levels. Within this framework, bodily acts, illuminated by rationality, acquire degrees of transcendence and value, rising beyond mere behavior to a higher ontological rank. Such an approach, in contrast to dualistic perspectives, such as Peripatetic and Cartesian schools, offers a theoretical foundation for the renewed reconstruction of ethical, educational, and psychological concepts based on Transcendent Philosophy. https://nasim-e-kherad.ismc.ir/article_237260.html The Laṭāʾif al-Sabʿa (Seven Subtleties), understood as the successive levels of the human nafs (soul), reflect the ontological gradations of the cosmic order. This reflection reveals a multilayered relationship between the diverse dimensions of the human being and the degrees of existence. Such relations have been articulated through various theoretical frameworks, including ʿayniyya (identity), ḥaqīqa wa raqīqa (reality and tenuity), ijmāl wa tafṣīl (in an undifferentiated and differentiated mode), and maʿiyya (togetherness). In theoretical mysticism, based on the principle of waḥdat al-wujūd al-shakhṣiyya (the personal unity of existence), all determinations of being are regarded as manifestations of a single reality, and their interrelations are analyzed through the mode of tamayyuz iḥāṭī (encompassing distinction). Conversely, in ḥikmat mutaʿāliyya (Transcendent Philosophy), the doctrine of tashkīk al-wujūd (gradation of existence) and the principle of al-basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa kull al-ashyāʾ (“the simple reality is all things”) provide a philosophical framework for examining these relations. According to this view, all existential levels return to a single simple reality that manifests in diverse forms. This study, through an analysis of the doctrines of Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn (Mullā Ṣadrā), and other Islamic sages, demonstrates that the concept of ḥaml (predication) al-ḥaqīqa wa al-raqīqa is key to a more precise understanding of the relation between the levels of the soul and the cosmic order. Furthermore, the issues of qurb (proximity) and fanāʾ (annihilation) in Islamic mysticism are examined as crucial indicators of this relation, with their connection to the doctrine of khilāfa ilāhiyya (divine vicegerency) elucidated. The findings indicate that the analysis of relations such as ʿayniyya, ijmāl wa tafṣīl, ḥaqīqa wa raqīqa, maʿiyya, mirʾātiyya (mirrorhood), and qayyūmiyya (sustainingness) extends not only to the levels of created determinations — such as nafs (soul), qalb (heart), ʿaql (intellect), and rūḥ (spirit) — but also to the highest levels of divine determinations, including sirr (secret), khafī (hidden), and akhfā (most hidden). This ensures a complete coherence between the structure of human subtleties and the mystical-ontological order. Within this framework, the analysis of the role of al-insān al-kāmil (the Perfect Human) as the mediator of divine effusion constitutes the central axis of this relationship. https://nasim-e-kherad.ismc.ir/article_240473.html The question of the “scientific status of metaphysics” constitutes one of the foundational issues in philosophy, an issue that acquired new layers of complexity with the emergence of Kant’s critical system. The significance of this question lies in the fact that the fate of other branches of knowledge depends upon how it is answered. Employing a comparative-analytical method, this study examines the views of Immanuel Kant and Ayatollah Allameh Mesbah Yazdi on this matter. The findings indicate that Kant, through his distinction between phenomenon and noumenon and his criterion of synthetic a priori propositions, declares traditional metaphysics impossible. Yet his position faces several major challenges, including contradictions in explaining the Ding an sich (thing‑in‑itself), methodological self-refutation, and a reductionist treatment of philosophical concepts. In contrast, Allameh Mesbah Yazdi—drawing upon al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī (knowledge by presence), the distinction between primary and secondary concepts, and the truth-disclosing nature of philosophical concepts—offers a coherent epistemological framework that renders knowledge of suprasensible realities possible. The study further shows that, despite its internal difficulties, Kant’s critique of metaphysics is primarily directed at deficient forms of metaphysics rather than at metaphysics as such. Moreover, ḥikmat‑i mutaʿāliyah (Transcendent Philosophy), by presenting a more complete and integrated form of metaphysics, opens new horizons for grounding metaphysics as a valid and rigorous science. https://nasim-e-kherad.ismc.ir/article_242205.html Although the philosophical kalām (Islamic theology) has a long history in the Islamic intellectual tradition, its precise nature has not yet been adequately clarified. Contrary to those who attempt to minimize the role of philosophy within kalām, I, the author, argue that once kalām became philosophically oriented, all of its core components underwent such a profound transformation that it is difficult to equate it with classical or pre-philosophical kalām. Given the fundamental role that philosophy plays in shaping kalām—and in light of the significant disagreements that exist regarding these philosophical foundations—it is necessary for kalām theologians, before engaging in issues of ilāhiyyāt bi‑maʿnā al‑akhṣṣ (metaphysics (theology) in its particular sense), to first determine their position within ilāhiyyāt bi‑maʿnā al‑aʿamm (metaphysics (theology) in its general sense). This study seeks to explain the elements of kalām that have been transformed by philosophy and, in light of these changes, to offer a precise definition of philosophical kalām. It also examines the distinguishing features of philosophical kalām in comparison with other cognate disciplines, thereby clarifying its intellectual relationship to them.