In the discourses of ethics and moral philosophy, the terms “moral judgments” and “moral principles” are frequently employed; however, the precise demarcation between them has consistently been a source of ambiguity and conflation. The primary problem of this study is the precise elucidation of the concepts of moral judgments and principles, alongside an examination of ʿAllāma Muḥammad-Taqī Miṣbāḥ Yazdī’s perspective on this matter. The primary objective of this study is to conduct a conceptual analysis of these two terms, clarify their distinctions, and approximately reconstruct ʿAllāma Miṣbāḥ’s moral system based on textual and verbal evidence from his works, thereby preventing the conflation of these concepts. The research methodology employed in this study is analytical-interpretative, drawing on direct references to the works of ʿAllāma Miṣbāḥ and comparing his views with select contemporary moral theories. The results indicate that “moral judgments” essentially refer to moral propositions. Furthermore, in the semantic analysis of moral principles, among the five distinct meanings of the term “moral principle” that can be deduced from his works, the fifth meaning—namely, the principle as the most universal moral judgment under which all other judgments are evaluated—constitutes the most accurate reconstruction of ʿAllāma Miṣbāḥ’s perspective.