Various theories challenge the objectivity of moral judgments, one of which is the theory of moral skepticism. The advocates of this theory rely on various evidence and arguments to justify moral skepticism. Among the primary arguments of moral skeptics is their appeal to descriptive relativism. According to this theory, the cultures of different societies comprise diverse elements, including differing moral judgments. This study examines whether descriptive relativism necessarily leads to moral skepticism. Using a descriptive-analytical method and a critical approach, the study seeks to demonstrate that the argument based on descriptive relativism, apart from its logical flaws and weaknesses, fails to represent human societies' cultural realities accurately. To achieve this, the argument of moral skeptics was first presented in the form of modus tollens condition, and then a critique of the second premise was used to counter the theory. A detailed investigation of cultural differences revealed that moral skepticism cannot be grounded in descriptive relativism. However, moral realism and descriptive relativism are conformable and can coexist. The devastating consequences of moral skepticism for human life make its examination unavoidable.