This study systematically examines the ontological nature of nīyyah (intention) and its relationship to external action as presented in Islamic narrations, through the lens of Ḥikmat-e Mutaʿāliyyah (Transcendent Philosophy). It addresses the fundamental question: What is the ontological status of nīyyah that makes it more foundational, superior, and efficacious than external action? Using a descriptive-analytical approach and library-based research, the study presents a precise conceptual framework of nīyyah and its relation to external actions. It concludes that the human soul (nafs)—in its graded and unified reality—manifests actions in two domains: jawāriḥī (by limbs) and jawānḥī (by the heart). The action by limbs precedes the action by the heart in ontological rank and serves as its causal foundation. Thus, external actions are contingent upon the actions through the heart and are considered their fruit and outcome. Furthermore, since nīyyah is classified as an action by limbs, it occupies a higher metaphysical rank than external deeds. It is therefore more virtuous (afḍal), more impactful, and plays a more significant role in guiding the human being toward divine closeness (qurb ilā Allāh).