The rule of "unprejudiced preference" is one of the fundamental rational principles in Islamic philosophy and theology, which implies the impossibility of preferring one possibility over another without a rational or external cause or preference. This rule has long played a key role in rejecting views based on coincidence or non-causal choice. One of the contemporary theories that has created the most challenging arena for philosophical theology is the "random selection of worlds" within the framework of the multiverse hypothesis and specific interpretations of quantum mechanics. This theory holds that the emergence or selection of our world among countless possible worlds is simply the result of a random event and does not require a rational preference. The necessity of the present study is to respond to this challenge from a rational-philosophical perspective and relying on the Islamic tradition, in a way that is both capable of dialogue with Western religious philosophy and utilizes the original foundations of Islamic wisdom. The research findings show that any attempt to justify the random selection of a world inevitably falls into a kind of unpreferred preference and is therefore logically incomplete. The innovation of this research lies in two aspects: first, the comparative interpretation of this rule in the context of the dialogue between Islamic philosophy and contemporary philosophy of religion; second, the presentation of a new analytical model that shows that random physical models also require a preference at the supernatural level. Therefore, this article, with an analytical-critical approach, examines the epistemological and ontological foundations of the unpreferred preference rule, explores its application in the critique of the theory of the random selection of worlds, and highlights the capacity for interdisciplinary dialogue and critique.