In Frege’s view, every form of reference (irjāʿ) from a word to an extra‑mental object occurs solely through the mediation of conceptual representation. By contrast, Russell and the early Wittgenstein maintained that applying such a theory leads to the problem of relativism. To escape this difficulty, they adopted two philosophical doctrines. First, in order to exit the realm of the mind, awareness must, via concepts, terminate in knowledge in which the subject is directly acquainted with a particular existing object in the outside world.  Second, following from this epistemic doctrine, they inferred a linguistic doctrine: in linguistic propositions, there are always words that contain no descriptive or conceptual meaning whatsoever, but are coined solely to serve as directly referential devices pointing to realities with which we are immediately acquainted. ʿAllāmah Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, in evaluating these two doctrines, sides with Frege regarding the second doctrine (concerning the impossibility of purely non-descriptive words), while granting Russell and Wittgenstein partial correctness regarding the first doctrine, but only in the domain of qaḍāyā‑yi khārijiyyah (propositions about extra‑mental states of affairs). After a brief examination of the second doctrine, this article—using a descriptive‑analytic method—offers an extended analysis of the first doctrine, namely the “impossibility of direct reference of words” (imtināʿ‑i dalālat‑i mustaqīm‑i alfāẓ). It then considers the implications of this debate for the nature of “meaning” (maʿnā), the proper task of philosophy, and the determination of philosophical method.