The question of the “scientific status of metaphysics” constitutes one of the foundational issues in philosophy, an issue that acquired new layers of complexity with the emergence of Kant’s critical system. The significance of this question lies in the fact that the fate of other branches of knowledge depends upon how it is answered. Employing a comparative-analytical method, this study examines the views of Immanuel Kant and Ayatollah Allameh Mesbah Yazdi on this matter. The findings indicate that Kant, through his distinction between phenomenon and noumenon and his criterion of synthetic a priori propositions, declares traditional metaphysics impossible. Yet his position faces several major challenges, including contradictions in explaining the Ding an sich (thing‑in‑itself), methodological self-refutation, and a reductionist treatment of philosophical concepts. In contrast, Allameh Mesbah Yazdi—drawing upon al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī (knowledge by presence), the distinction between primary and secondary concepts, and the truth-disclosing nature of philosophical concepts—offers a coherent epistemological framework that renders knowledge of suprasensible realities possible. The study further shows that, despite its internal difficulties, Kant’s critique of metaphysics is primarily directed at deficient forms of metaphysics rather than at metaphysics as such. Moreover, ḥikmat‑i mutaʿāliyah (Transcendent Philosophy), by presenting a more complete and integrated form of metaphysics, opens new horizons for grounding metaphysics as a valid and rigorous science.